|  | // Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | 
|  | // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | 
|  | // found in the LICENSE file. | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include <cert.h> | 
|  | #include <keyhi.h> | 
|  | #include <secoid.h> | 
|  |  | 
|  | #include "base/logging.h" | 
|  | #include "crypto/scoped_nss_types.h" | 
|  | #include "net/cert/sha256_legacy_support_win.h" | 
|  |  | 
|  | namespace net { | 
|  |  | 
|  | namespace sha256_interception { | 
|  |  | 
|  | BOOL CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureExHook( | 
|  | CryptVerifyCertificateSignatureExFunc original_func, | 
|  | HCRYPTPROV_LEGACY provider, | 
|  | DWORD encoding_type, | 
|  | DWORD subject_type, | 
|  | void* subject_data, | 
|  | DWORD issuer_type, | 
|  | void* issuer_data, | 
|  | DWORD flags, | 
|  | void* extra) { | 
|  | CHECK(original_func); | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Only intercept if the arguments are supported. | 
|  | if (provider != NULL || (encoding_type != X509_ASN_ENCODING) || | 
|  | !IsSupportedSubjectType(subject_type) || subject_data == NULL || | 
|  | !IsSupportedIssuerType(issuer_type) || issuer_data == NULL) { | 
|  | return original_func(provider, encoding_type, subject_type, subject_data, | 
|  | issuer_type, issuer_data, flags, extra); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | base::StringPiece subject_signature = | 
|  | GetSubjectSignature(subject_type, subject_data); | 
|  | bool should_intercept = false; | 
|  |  | 
|  | crypto::ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE)); | 
|  | CERTSignedData signed_data; | 
|  | memset(&signed_data, 0, sizeof(signed_data)); | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Attempt to decode the subject using the generic "Signed Data" template, | 
|  | // which all of the supported subject types match. If the signature | 
|  | // algorithm is RSA with one of the SHA-2 algorithms supported by NSS | 
|  | // (excluding SHA-224, which is pointless), then defer to the NSS | 
|  | // implementation. Otherwise, fall back and let the OS handle it (e.g. | 
|  | // in case there are any algorithm policies in effect). | 
|  | if (!subject_signature.empty()) { | 
|  | SECItem subject_sig_item; | 
|  | subject_sig_item.data = const_cast<unsigned char*>( | 
|  | reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(subject_signature.data())); | 
|  | subject_sig_item.len = subject_signature.size(); | 
|  | SECStatus rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem( | 
|  | arena.get(), &signed_data, SEC_ASN1_GET(CERT_SignedDataTemplate), | 
|  | &subject_sig_item); | 
|  | if (rv == SECSuccess) { | 
|  | SECOidTag signature_alg = | 
|  | SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&signed_data.signatureAlgorithm); | 
|  | if (signature_alg == SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION || | 
|  | signature_alg == SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION || | 
|  | signature_alg == SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION) { | 
|  | should_intercept = true; | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | if (!should_intercept) { | 
|  | return original_func(provider, encoding_type, subject_type, subject_data, | 
|  | issuer_type, issuer_data, flags, extra); | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Rather than attempting to synthesize a CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo by hand, | 
|  | // just force the OS to do an ASN.1 encoding and then decode it back into | 
|  | // NSS. This is silly for performance, but safest for consistency. | 
|  | PCERT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO issuer_public_key = | 
|  | GetIssuerPublicKey(issuer_type, issuer_data); | 
|  | if (!issuer_public_key) { | 
|  | SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(NTE_BAD_ALGID)); | 
|  | return FALSE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | unsigned char* issuer_spki_data = NULL; | 
|  | DWORD issuer_spki_len = 0; | 
|  | if (!CryptEncodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING, X509_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO, | 
|  | issuer_public_key, CRYPT_ENCODE_ALLOC_FLAG, NULL, | 
|  | &issuer_spki_data, &issuer_spki_len)) { | 
|  | return FALSE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | SECItem nss_issuer_spki; | 
|  | nss_issuer_spki.data = issuer_spki_data; | 
|  | nss_issuer_spki.len = issuer_spki_len; | 
|  | CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo* spki = | 
|  | SECKEY_DecodeDERSubjectPublicKeyInfo(&nss_issuer_spki); | 
|  | ::LocalFree(issuer_spki_data); | 
|  | if (!spki) { | 
|  | SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(NTE_BAD_ALGID)); | 
|  | return FALSE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | // Attempt to actually verify the signed data. If it fails, synthesize the | 
|  | // failure as a generic "bad signature" and let CryptoAPI handle the rest. | 
|  | SECStatus rv = CERT_VerifySignedDataWithPublicKeyInfo( | 
|  | &signed_data, spki, NULL); | 
|  | SECKEY_DestroySubjectPublicKeyInfo(spki); | 
|  | if (rv != SECSuccess) { | 
|  | SetLastError(static_cast<DWORD>(NTE_BAD_SIGNATURE)); | 
|  | return FALSE; | 
|  | } | 
|  | return TRUE; | 
|  | } | 
|  |  | 
|  | }  // namespace sha256_interception | 
|  |  | 
|  | }  // namespace net |